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Notes and Comments
Hospice: An Alternative Treatment of
Care for the Terminally Ill
I. Introduction
In the Middle Ages, the hospice of the monastery was a
place of welcome for strangers, pilgrims, and poor travelers.1 Re-
freshing the travelers in mind and spirit as well as body, the
hospice became synonomous with a holistic concept of care.2 The
hospice of today,' whether it is home based or institution based,
1. Institutions for the aged as well as homes for poor travelers provided medical
services so that "hospice" and "hospital" eventually became synonomous terms. 6 Dic-
TIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 288 (1985). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1114 (15th
ed. 1982) ("The monasteries possessed an 'infirmitorium', a place to which their sick
were taken for treatment. The monasteries had a pharmacy and frequently a garden with
medicinal plants. In addition to caring for sick monks, the monasteries opened their
doors to pilgrims and other travelers.").
2. "The typical medieval hospice was a blend of guest house and infirmary where all
comers were given food, shelter, and care until they died or set out again, refreshed and
renewed, on their journeys." A. MUNLEY, THE HOSPICE ALTERNATIVE 28 (1983).
3. There is considerable variation among the types of services provided by hospices
nationwide. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) survey has
identified six major hospice provider types. The acute care hospital has a hospice unit,
identifies hospice beds, or identifies hospice patients on any ward and addresses their
needs by a "floating team" (the scattered bed approach). The community home health
agency is most often a visiting nurse association whose staff is divided into teams to
provide hospice care to individual hospice patients. The independent hospice program is
not owned by any other health care institution or agency. These programs are usually
licensed and receive reimbursement as home health agencies but serve hospice patients
only. A long-term care facility has one to four identified hospice beds, may or may not
have identified hospice inpatient staff, but usually provides general home care services
through a contract with a home care agency. Volunteer hospices have an average of 1.5
full-time paid staff that can include physicians, registered nurses, social workers, and
others. The case management hospice works with an existing home health agency and/or
hospital by providing services that are hospice specific. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
HEALTH, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MATERIALS ON MEDICARE BENEFIT 5-6 (Comm. Print
1983). A March 1983 survey by JCAH identified the independent hospice, the hospital
hospice, and the home health agency hospice as the largest types of program ownership.
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also focuses on the total person. It is a program of palliative and
supportive services which provides physical, psychological, so-
cial, and spiritual care for dying persons and their families." Dr.
Cecily Saunders, a medical doctor dedicated to improving meth-
ods of pain control for terminally ill cancer patients, initiated
the hospice movement when she opened St. Christopher's Hos-
pice in London in 1968.1 In the early 1970's, this original concept
formed the basis of a United States hospice movement.'
The first American hospice was Hospice, Inc., in New Ha-
ven, Connecticut (later renamed the Connecticut Hospice),
which began serving home care patients in 19741 as a demonstra-
tion project funded by the National Cancer Institute.' Initial
progress on the New Haven project was slow and there was con-
cern regarding public unwillingness to accept a radically differ-
ent concept of care for the terminally ill.9 From one program,
Id. at 7. Millhaven Hospice in Tucson, Arizona, an independent hospice, offers care in
the home, day care at the hospice, 24 hour inpatient care, and bereavement services for
the family. G. DAVIDSON, THE HOSPICE 63-64 (1978). The Permanente Medical Group in
California is an example of a hospice program within an acute care hospital. The patient
is admitted under his attending physician's orders and the hospice physicians serve as
consultants for developing strategies for symptom control and management. M. HAMIL-
TON & H. REID, A HOSPICE HANDBOOK 145-46 (1980). The home health agency program is
frequently a special unit of the local public health nursing association. This type of pro-
gram usually requires that there be a member of the family designated as the primary
caregiver. R. BUCKINGHAM, THE COMPLETE HOSPICE GUIDE 31-34 (1983).
4. A. MUNLEY, THE HOSPICE ALTERNATIVE app. A, 320-21 (1983) (quoting the Na-
tional Hospice Organization's Standards of a Hospice Program of Care).
5. Id. at 29. Now a model for modern hospice care, St. Christopher's program offers
inpatient care, home care, and bereavement services. Id.
6.
The modern hospice as conceived in Great Britain is more than an attempt to
revitalize the holistic focus, the sense of community, and the spirit of welcome
that medieval caregivers offered. It sets before the American public an ideology
that, if properly implemented, can humanize and reform existing patterns of ter-
minal care.
Id. at 30.
7. G. DAVIDSON, THE HOSPICE 41 (1978). The goal of the project was to demonstrate
home care for the terminally ill without aggressive rehabilitative treatment and to see if
this type of care was acceptable to the American public. Id.
8. Id.
9.
There was concern at the outset that palliative home care would be unacceptable
in this country. I was frequently told that 'Americans are hospital oriented; when
Americans are sick they want to be in the hospital.' 'Nobody dies at home in this
country. The society is not set up for it.'
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/3
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Hospice, Inc., the hospice philosophy of care has grown into a
nationwide health care industry with 1,568 hospices across the
country."°
The hospice movement in the United States developed in-
dependent of any federal regulation until 1982.11 That year, a
congressional decision to include hospice care under Part A of
Medicare 2 heralded a new era for the hospice program, its pa-
tients, and their families. The congressional goals in enacting
this legislation were to contain health care costs and to provide
compassionate care for the terminally ill. 3 The National Hos-
pice Study by Brown University shows an average adjusted sav-
ings of $2,221 per patient for home care based hospices and $585
for hospital based hospices.' 4 The question of cost effectiveness
of hospice care and the savings to Medicare will continue to be
monitored.15 It is difficult to quantify a program that provides
intangible benefits of dignity and privacy for a terminally ill pa-
tient and support for his family. The entry of Medicare benefits
into the hospice program, however, demands a closer watch over
the cost of this type of care as well as over the cost of traditional
Id. (quoting Sylvia A. Lack, Hospice, Inc.); see also R. BUCKINGHAM, THE COMPLETE Hos-
PICE GUIDE 14 (1983).
10. Telephone interview by the author with Ira Bates, National Hospice Organiza-
tion (June 18, 1986).
11. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
356 § 122 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-1 to 1395h, 1395x to 1395z,
1395aa to 1395cc (1982)).
12. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 102, 79 Stat. 286, 291-332
(1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982)). (Medicare is a federal health insur-
ance program for the aged and certain disabled covering hospital insurance (Part A) and
physician and certain other services (Part B)). See generally 1986 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) 5315-16.
13. H. R. 30773, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H30826 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
1981) (remarks of Senator Leon Panetta in introducing legislation to make hospice care
reimbursable under the Medicare program).
14. National Hospice Organization, Hospice News 5 (May 1986) (newsletter). The
greatest saving is during the last month of life, and the relative savings are reduced the
longer the patient is in the hospice program. Id.
15. Id. at 5. Congress has mandated three new studies to provide better information
about cost effectiveness and the quality of care under the hospice benefit. Abt Associa-
tions is doing the largest study through 1988. Jack Martin and Company is doing a cost
analysis of non-Medicare certified hospices to serve as a control group for the evaluation.
The Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals is surveying sixty Medicare certified
and sixty noncertified hospices in order to determine whether Medicare participation is
affecting the quality of hospice care. Id.
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care.
Moving a volunteer-based organization into the arena of
federal regulation raises important issues for attorneys,"6 health
care professionals, 17 and hospice patients.'8 This Comment will
review these issues and analyze them as they apply to the future
of hospice as an alternative method of care for the terminally ill.
Part II of the Comment is an analysis of the provisions of
the federal legislation as well as the licensure and regulatory
provisions of two states, New York and Connecticut. The role of
the volunteer, central to the hospice philosophy, is discussed in
Part III. The fundamental issue of the hospice's liability for the
acts of those working in a volunteer capacity is examined.
The care of the terminally ill raises a number of ethical
questions which are discussed in Part IV. It is a basic philosoph-
ical premise of hospice that a patient has the right to forego life-
sustaining treatment. This right is inherent in the patient's right
of privacy and right of self-determination. In order to make a
decision to participate in the hospice program, a patient and his
family must understand the nature of his illness, the prognosis,
and the ramifications of his decision to elect hospice care. The
physician's duty to disclose this information is also addressed in
Part IV.
This Comment concludes that the future of hospice has
been firmly secured through the action of Congress which brings
hospice under Part A of Medicare. At the same time, profession-
als and volunteers alike must be sensitive to the need to retain
16. Hurzeler, Barnum & Abbott, Hospice, The Beginning or the End?: The Impact
of TEFRA on Hospice Care in the United States, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 69, 73-74
(1983). Lawyers should be aware of federal involvement in a previously self-regulated
area. As federal reimbursement increases the development of hospice programs, lawyers
must advise providers, insurance payers, and patients. Id.
17. Tehan, Has Success Spoiled Hospice?, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 11-12 (1985).
Regulations impose restrictions raising a concern that a minimum standard of operation
has been established with little incentive for improvement. Cost concerns force the hos-
pice staff to make decisions about admission to a hospital setting which are not always in
the patient's best interest. Id.
18. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
116-17 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT]. The federal legisla-
tion's reimbursement programs impose restraints on the hospice providers that may limit
patient choice and undermine self-determination. The reduced cost factor of hospice
may also limit the patient's access to more aggressive treatment. Id.
[Vol. 8:115
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the original concept and philosophy of hospice care. Attorneys
must be aware of the unique quality of hospice care and must
understand the regulatory process in order to provide counsel to
patients.
II. Legislation
A. Federal
The hospice program was considerably strengthened when
Congress voted to extend Medicare"' coverage to hospice care
under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) in
1.982.20 Primarily an effort to control the federal government's
health care costs, TEFRA became effective on November 1,
1983, and was to terminate in 1986.21 On April 7, 1986, Congress
enacted the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA), which eliminated the temporary status of the hospice
benefit.2"
An important element in the hospice program is the use of
the interdisciplinary team.23 This approach is central to the hos-
pice belief that because a person is a composite of physical,
psychosocial, social, and spiritual components, hospice care must
be provided by a team in which these various disciplines are rep-
resented.24 The hospice standard of an integrated administrative
structure2 5 is followed in the federal provision for a governing
body to assume responsibility for the hospice's total operation.2"
19. Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-1 to 1395h, 1395x to 1395z, 1395aa to 1395cc (1982).
21. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 356, § 122(h)(1)(A) (1982).
22. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 168, § 9123 (1986).
23. A. MUNLEY supra note 2, at 321 (citing National Hospice Organization's Stan-
dards of a Hospice Program of Care, 1982). The standards formulated by the National
Hospice Organization state that "[hiospice care consists of a blending of professional and
nonprofessional services, provided by an interdisciplinary team, including a medical di-
rector." 42 C.F.R. § 418.68 (1986). The federal regulations require that the hospice have
an interdisciplinary group which includes a doctor, a registered nurse, a social worker,
and a pastoral or other counselor. Id.
24. NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, THE BASICS OF HOSPICE (1986) (brochure).
25. R. BUCKINGHAM, THE COMPLETE HOSPICE GUIDE 53 (1983) (administrator is liai-
son with the medical director and director of home care programs).
26. "A hospice must have a governing body that assumes full legal responsibility for
determining, implementing and monitoring policies governing the hospice's total opera-
tion." 42 C.F.R. § 481.52 (1986).
19881
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Hospice standards require a quality assurance program that in-
cludes an evaluation of services.21 The federal regulations also
mandate "a self-assessment of the quality and appropriateness
of care provided."2 8 An essential element of the hospice program
is the availability of home care services on a twenty-four hour
basis.29 These provisions ensure that the hospice concept of care
is continued in the form and intent in which it was developed.
1. Election of Hospice Benefits
Eligibility for hospice care requires that a patient be enti-
tled to Medicare Part A benefits 0 and be certified as terminally
ill" (defined as a medical prognosis that life expectancy is six
months or less).3 2 When a patient meets the eligibility require-
ments, a statement must be filed with the hospice that the pa-
tient has elected to receive hospice care. 3
After electing the hospice benefit, the patient is entitled to
receive hospice care for two ninety-day periods with an addi-
tional thirty-day period after the first two periods are com-
pleted.3 4 The hospice must continue to care for the patient, how-
ever, until he dies - even if this should extend beyond the
election period.3 5 The hospice then has the financial responsibil-
ity of supporting the patient without additional reimbursement
from Medicare. This provision severely restricts hospice's ability
to accept patients with terminal diseases such as AIDS and
Alzheimer's because the lives of these patients may extend be-
27. "There will be a quality assurance program that includes: a. Evaluation of ser-
vices. b. Regular chart audits. c. Organizational review." A. MUNLEY, supra note 2, at 321
(citing National Hospice Organization's Standards of a Hospice Program of Care, 1982).
28. "The findings are used by the hospice to correct identified problems and to re-
vise hospice policies if necessary." 42 C.F.R. § 418.66 (1986).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 418.50(b)(2) (1986).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982). Persons qualifying for Medicare benefits are those over
65 and qualified railroad beneficiaries. See generally 1986 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 5315-16.
31. 42 C.F.R. § 418.20 (1986).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1) (1986).
33. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(a) (1986).
34. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(b) (1986). These time segments are defined as "election peri-
ods." 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (1986).
35. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(c) (1986). Election to receive hospice care continues as long as
the patient remains in the care of a hospice. Id.
[Vol. 8:115
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yond the six month prognosis.36 Congress is presently consider-
ing legislation, the Medicare Catastrophic Protection Act of
1987,11 which would allow an extension beyond the 210 day
limit3 8
2. Waiver of Other Benefits
The statute and the regulations have provisions requiring
hospice beneficiaries to waive certain other Medicare benefits.
The waiver includes foregoing hospice care provided by another
hospice program (unless the provider hospice makes such ar-
rangements) and foregoing any Medicare services that are re-
lated to the patient's terminal illness. 9 The services of the pa-
tient's attending physician, if other than the hospice physician,
are still covered by Medicare.40 The statute includes a provision
that the patient waives payments for benefits except in "such
exceptional and unusual circumstances as the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] may provide." '41
The regulations provide that a patient or a representative
may revoke the election of hospice care at any time during the
election period."2 The patient then resumes conventional Medi-
care coverage' and only loses the remaining days of that partic-
ular election period. The patient may also make a new election
for another period and is entitled to change hospice programs
once in each election period."
36. Telephone interview by the author with Andrew Parker, Director of Develop-
ment, National Hospice Organization (Sept. 4, 1987).
37. H.R. 2470, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H6452 (daily ed. July 22,
1987). The bill passed the House on July 22, 1987. As of this writing, the bill is still
under consideration by the Senate.
38. 133 CONG. REc. H6468 (1987).
39. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH, supra note 3, at 25. The treatment of
illnesses, such as pneumonia, which are brought on by the underlying condition of the
patient are considered a hospice service. Payment of other Medicare benefits would be
waived by the hospice election. Id.
40. 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(e)(2)(iii) (1986).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(d)(2)(A) (1982). The circumstances that would warrant this
exception are not specified in the regulations.
42. 42 C.F.R. § 418.28(a) (1986).
43. 42 C.F.R. § 418.28(c)(2) (1986).
44. 42 C.F.R. § 418.30(a) (1986).
19881
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3. Covered Services
The regulations state that hospice services, to be covered by
Medicare, "must be reasonable and necessary for the palliation
or management of the terminal illness as well as related condi-
tions.' 5 In addition, a written plan of care must be established
by the attending physician, the hospice medical director, and
the interdisciplinary team before services are provided.46 The
plan includes assessment of the patient's needs and identifica-
tion of the services, including the management of discomfort
and symptom relief.47 Adherence to this provision fulfills the
stated goal of the hospice concept of care "to provide symptom
control through appropriate palliative therapies."' 8
Included in the covered hospice services are: nursing care,
medical social services, physician services, counseling services,
short-term inpatient care, medical appliances and drugs, home
health aide services, and physical, occupational, and speech
therapy.' In addition, there is special coverage for periods of
crisis, respite care, and bereavement counseling. Nursing care
may be covered on a continuous basis for as much as twenty-
four hours a day during periods of crises, 50 with crisis defined as
a period in which the patient requires continuous care to achieve
management of acute medical symptoms.51 Respite care is pro-
vided when necessary to relieve the family members or other
persons caring for the individual.52 The patient is placed in an
inpatient facility for periods of up to five days, but only on "an
occasional basis."5 This provision leaves considerable discretion
to the provider in evaluating the family's need for respite care.
45. 42 C.F.R. § 418.200 (1986).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 418.58(a) (1986).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 418.58(c) (1986).
48. A. MUNLEY, supra note 2, at 321 (citing National Hospice Organization's Stan-
dards of a Hospice Program of Care, (1982)).
49. 42 C.F.R. § 418.202 (1986).
50. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(a) (1986).
51. Id.
52. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(b)(1) (1986).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(b)(2) (1986).
[Vol. 8:115
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4. Bereavement Services
Since the hospice focus is on the entire family, bereavement
follow-up is an important component of a hospice program. Be-
reavement counseling is considered to be necessary in light of
the sufferings of families after a death.54 A typical hospice be-
reavement team includes either a trained counselor or nurse and
a highly trained volunteer. The program usually begins with a
visit to the family one month after the death, with follow-up
calls at three month intervals until the first anniversary of the
death.15 High risk survivors, such as adolescents or young wid-
ows with children, are identified as needing more in-depth, pro-
fessional counseling. 6
Bereavement counseling is a required hospice service for
Medicare coverage, but it is not reimbursable. 57 Hospice provid-
ers, therefore, depend upon volunteers to assist in fulfilling the
bereavement component of the hospice program.
5. Core Services
TEFRA requires that the hospice must "routinely provide
directly substantially" all of the nursing, medical, social, physi-
cian, and counseling services. 8 The regulations define "directly"
to require that these "core" services be provided by hospice em-
ployees.59 "'Routinely' and 'substantially' have been generally
defined to mean that the services provided directly by the hos-
pice should be adequate to meet the general needs of the hos-
pice." s Hospice staff can use contracted staff only to supple-
ment hospice employees during periods of peak patient loads."
Economic factors, as well as the shortage of available personnel,
make full-time nursing staffs infeasible in rural and underserved
54. G. DAVIDSON, supra note 7, at 49. The consequences of bereavement include in-
creased vulnerability to illness, "increased alcoholism, reactive depression, and long term
detrimental effects to children caused by the loss of a parent." Id.
55. R. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 25, at 140.
56. Id. at 141.
57. 42 C.F.R. § 418.204(c) (1986).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (1982).
59. 42 C.F.R. § 418.80 (1986).
60. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE DIVISION,
HOSPICE CARE UNDER MEDICARE 6 (1986).
61. 42 C.F.R. § 418.80 (1986).
19881
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areas. Hospice service, therefore, can be offered only by the coa-
lition of local health departments and home health agencies. As
a result, Congress has allowed a waiver of the nursing care com-
ponent of the "core services" requirements for rural hospices
that were in operation on or before January 1, 1983, and which
have demonstrated a good faith effort (as determined by the
Secretary) to hire a sufficient number of nurses to provide nurs-
ing care directly.6 2 This legislation still does not address the
same staffing constraints faced by the many hospices which work
with home health agencies in nonrural areas or hospices in rural
areas that have come into existence after January 1, 1983. In an
effort to address this problem, Senator Robert W. Kasten intro-
duced S.32263 to amend the Deficit Reduction Act to permit a
hospice in a rural or medically underserved area, incorporated
before January 1, 1985, to contract for nursing care with a Medi-
care-certified provider. In introducing this bill, the Senator
stated, "We have provided coverage for a service many people
will never benefit from - not because they are ineligible, but
because too few hospices will be able to meet the criteria the law
mandates. In effect, we have rendered the hospice benefit virtu-
ally nonexistent in many areas."6' The bill was referred to the
Committee on Finance where it failed to receive the support
necessary to enable it to go further. 5
6. Costs
The overwhelming benefit of the hospice program is in pro-
viding humane care for persons dying of terminal illness. Reduc-
ing the escalating health care costs of the federal government,
however, is also an important consideration in the hospice legis-
lation. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cov-
erage of hospice care under TEFRA would save $109 million
during the first five years after enactment.6 This estimate indi-
cated that each new user of hospice services will save Medicare
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
63. S. 322, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S893 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985).
64. Id.
65. Telephone interview by the author with a staff person in Senator Kasten's
Washington, D.C. office (Mar. 25, 1987).
66. A. MUNLEY, supra note 2, at 289.
[Vol. 8:115
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$1,100.67
Since there is not a significant savings between hospice in-
patient care and traditional hospital care, the major cost saving
factor is in the use of home care services. A Blue Cross study in
1982 reported that the average costs for 681 patients under the
Connecticut Hospice Program ranged from $1,257 for home care
patients to $18,927 for patients receiving home care and up to
six inpatient admissions.6 8 TEFRA establishes that the amount
of payment for hospice care may not exceed a "cap amount" and
sets forth the method for computing that amount. 9 The cap
amount is $6,500 per beneficiary per year and is adjusted for in-
flationary changes by using the percentage change in the medical
care expenditure category of the Consumer Price Index."0
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has es-
tablished payment amounts according to the level of care fur-
nished to the patient.71 TEFRA requires that the hospice pro-
gram provide assurances that the aggregate number of inpatient
days in any twelve month period not exceed twenty percent of
the aggregate number of days of care provided by the hospice. 2
An individual patient may stay in an inpatient facility longer
than twenty percent of his total number of days in the hospice
program, 3 but the inpatient days for all patients aggregated
may not exceed twenty percent of the total number of days of
care given by a hospice provider.7 ' This requirement insures the
potential cost benefit by encouraging care in the home.
7. Coinsurance and Intermediaries
TEFRA requires some coinsurance for outpatients.7 5 For
palliative drugs and biological prescriptions furnished by the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 288.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(A) (1982).
70. 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 (1986).
71. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 168, § 9123(b)(1)(B) (1986) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985)). Payment amounts are determined within each
of the following categories: routine home care, $63.17; continuous home care, up to
$68.67; inpatient respite care, $65.33/day; general inpatient care, $281.00/day. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(2)(A)(iii) (1982).
73. Hurzeler, Barnum & Abbott, supra note 16, at 90.
74. 42 C.F.R. § 418.302(f) (1986).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e(a)(4)(A)(i), (ii) (1982).
1988]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
hospice, the patient is liable for five percent of the cost of each
prescription.76 This amount is not to exceed five dollars per pre-
scription.7 7 Respite care also has a coinsurance requirement
equal to five percent of the estimated payments to the hospice
program.s
Under TEFRA7 9  the Secretary designates the in-
termediaries 0 to service hospice. Hospices may not nominate or
change an intermediary."' Freestanding hospices receive pay-
ment for covered hospice services through an intermediary des-
ignated by HCFA. Hospices that are part of other Medicare
providers receive payment from the same intermediary that
serves the parent provider.82
B. State Licensure
TEFRA states that hospice programs must be licensed ac-
cording to state law in order to be Medicare certified.8 3 This re-
quirement effectively allows the state to control the quality of
care and to protect the consumer. The National Hospice Organi-
zation regards the licensing procedure as a means of protecting
the hospice name and providing a legal basis for the hospice pro-
gram.84 Laws regarding licensure of hospice have been passed in
twenty-six states.85
76. 42 C.F.R. § 418.400(a) (1986).
77. Id.
78. 42 C.F.R. § 418.400(b) (1986).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(e)(5) (1982).
80. 42 C.F.R. 8 418.3 (1986) (defining intermediary as an organization that has a
contract with the Secretary to administer the benefits covered by Medicare's hospital
insurance program).
81. 42 C.F.R. §8 421.104, 421.106 (1986).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 421.117(c) (1986).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(2)(F) (1982).
84. NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE LICENSURE AND REGULATIONS: ISSUES
AND GUIDELINES 2 (Jan. 1986).
85. The states with hospice licensure requirements are: Arkansas, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia. Telephone interview by the author with Andrew Parker, Director of Develop-
ment, National Hospice Organization (Sept. 4, 1987).
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1. Connecticut
Connecticut developed separate licensure regulations as
part of its Public Health Code in 1979.86 The regulations are
highly specific as to the physical plant of a freestanding hospice.
The emphasis on design serves to implement the hospice philos-
ophy by creating a setting that is as homelike as possible in or-
der to provide for the comfort, privacy, and dignity of the pa-
tients. Following the hospice concept that the patient and family
are a unit of care, the regulations provide for the comfort of the
family as well. The statute has a minimum space per bed re-
quirement to provide ample room for patients, families, and visi-
tors.8 7 There are provisions for kitchens where families can pre-
pare food, laundry facilities for family caregivers to launder the
patient's personal laundry, a private consultation room, a
chapel, and a separate room for viewing the deceased patient's
body.88
Another unique feature of the Connecticut hospice licensure
statute is the mandate that the hospice provide "extensive op-
portunities for experiences in the arts to patient/family. ' 89 The
art director must have a graduate degree, clinical experience in a
hospital based setting in the arts, and a minimum of five years
supervisory experience in the arts and education. 0 The art di-
rector is a member of the interdisciplinary team.91 The mandate
for an art director expresses a state concern for the spiritual and
emotional needs of the patient and his family. The state thus
goes beyond the federal standards and provides the hospice ben-
eficiary with an even higher standard of care.
2. New York
New York State began to develop the hospice concept with
the enactment of Chapter 718 of the laws of 1978.92 This legisla-
tion amended the Public Health Law by defining hospice as a
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-36 (West 1986).
87, CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D4b(a)(6)(B)(3) (1979).
88. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D4b(a)(7)(E), (J), (T), (U), (CC)(3) (1979).
89. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D4b(i)(1) (1979).
90. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D4b(i)(2) (1979).
91. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D4b(i)(3) (1979).
92. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4000-4012 (McKinney 1985).
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separate provider entity within the health care system. Chapter
718 also established a hospice demonstration program to evalu-
ate the use of hospices within the health care system of the
state. 3 The program became effective on January 1, 1980, and
terminated on July 1, 1983.1"
In 1983, the New York State Legislature enacted legislation
concerning the establishment and certification of hospices in Ar-
ticle 40 of the Public Health Law."5 Under this law, a proposed
hospice must obtain a certificate of approval from the Public
Health Council. Each hospice must also be approved by the
State Hospital Review and Planning Agency and the local health
systems agency. The Public Health Council will approve an ap-
plication only if it is satisfied as to the public need for the exis-
tence of the hospice, as well as the competence and financial re-
sources of the proposed hospice.9 6 The Act provides that the
Commissioner and the State Hospital Review and Planning
Council establish and supervise the standards of services and
medical care.97 While the statute also allows for contractual
agreements between a hospice and providers of other care and
services, the hospice must maintain full responsibility for the
planning, coordination, and quality of the services.9 8 As of Sep-
tember 1987, seventeen hospice programs had been approved
under Article 40 of the Public Health Law.99
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Act of 1985 (COBRA)'
mandates federal financial participation under Medicaid for hos-
pice services. The New York Legislature enacted S. 9094 to en-
sure that Medicaid recipients receive hospice services and that
hospice providers are reimbursed for these services. 1 These
state and federal initiatives supporting the hospice program in-
93. NEW YORK STATE SENATE COMMIrEE ON AGING, HOSPICE, ITS CONCEPT AND DE-
VELOPMENT 14-15 (1982).
94. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4008 (McKinney 1985) extended the program from
March 1, 1983 to July 1, 1983.
95. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4000-4012 (McKinney 1985).
96. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4004 (McKinney 1985).
97. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4010 (McKinney 1985).
98. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4008(3) (McKinney 1985).
99. Telephone interview by the author with Teresa Scilipote, New York State De-
partment of Health (Sept. 8, 1987).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982).
101. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 365-a(2)(m) (McKinney 1986).
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dicate that the program clearly fills a need in the existing health
care system. The philosophy of hospice has been fully accepted
and is now supported financially by the federal government,
making it a realistic choice of care for the terminally ill.
3. Private Health Insurance
Major insurance providers have been supportive of the hos-
pice concept with thirty-nine major carriers offering hospice
benefits under their medical insurance plans.102 Blue Cross and
Blue Shield's criteria for supporting hospice care is that there be
a community need for hospice and assurance of the quality and
cost effectiveness of the hospice program of care. 10 3 The insur-
ance companies see hospice as a viable alternative to traditional
hospital care and a means of containing the high costs of that
care. For example, "Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio reported that
the average insurance payment during the last two weeks of life
with community hospice was $699, compared to $2,140 for tradi-
tional hospital care."''
Hospice is additionally supported by major employers who
include a hospice benefit in health insurance plans for their em-
ployees. General Electric, RCA, Westinghouse, and the United
Auto Workers in New York State are four major organizations
that have developed hospice benefit plans.10 5
The legislatures of both New York and Connecticut have
enacted laws mandating insurance coverage for hospice care.
The Connecticut law requires that every individual or group
hospital or medical insurance policy provides coverage for home
health care, 06 which is defined as the continued care and treat-
ment at home of a person under the care of a physician. Under
the statute, this includes hospice patients. 07 Care must be pro-
vided by an agency federally certified as a home health agency
and licensed by the state. 0 8
102. Telephone interview by the author with Ira Bates, National Hospice Organiza-
tion (June 18, 1986).
103. R. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 25, at 79.
104. NASSIF, THE HOME HEALTH CARE SOLUTION 282 (1985).
105. NEw YORK STATE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGING, supra note 93, at 20.
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174k(a) (West 1986).
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174k(b) (West 1986).
108. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174k(c) (West 1986).
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New York's amendment to the Insurance Law, which be-
came effective January 1, 1986, also requires commercial insur-
ers to provide coverage for hospice care to group policy hold-
ers. 109 This legislation adheres to the federal guidelines for
Medicare benefits. Hospice care coverage of at least 210 days
and five visits for bereavement counseling services must be
provided. 110
Legislation of this type strongly supports the hospice move-
ment, enhancing the availability of hospices to all who are in
need. Since cancer is a disease for which prognostication of
death within a few months can be made with acceptable reliabil-
ity, cancer patients make up most of the hospice patient popula-
tion."' In 1983, 442,986 people in the United States died of can-
cer. Of that number, more than half, 282,926, were sixty-five
years and older and therefore entitled to Medicare benefits." 2
However, the movement toward commercial insurance coverage
for hospice care is significant for the remaining population who
might be in need of hospice care and without recourse to federal
funding.
III. Volunteers
Voluntarism is central to the hospice concept.' 1 The roots
of hospice lie in the theory of caregivers who, of their own voli-
109. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(1) (10)(A) (McKinney 1987).
110. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3221(l) (10)(C) (McKinney 1987).
111. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 112 (approximately 95% of hos-
pice patients have cancer).
112. Telephone interview by the author with Joyce Schull, National Center for
Health Statistics (June 18, 1986).
113. H. HAMILTON & H. REID, A HOSPICE HANDBOOK 157-72 (1980) (citing M. Cox,
THE CONNECTICUT HOSPICE VOLUNTEER PROGRAM). The Connecticut Hospice is a good
example of an organized hospice volunteer program and the role of the volunteer. The
program policies state that volunteer services are an integral component of the hospice
program, that volunteers do not replace paid positions, and that all applicants must be
interviewed by the director and participate in an orientation course. The purpose of
these policies is to ensure that volunteers understand the hospice program and are
placed in jobs that best utilize their skills. Id. at 162-63. The orientation course provides
an opportunity for the Director to evaluate the volunteer's suitability for direct patient/
family care and helps the volunteer understand the degree of involvement in patient
care. Id. at 166-70. Volunteers who choose to work directly with patients travel with
experienced caregivers for a practical training process. Id. at 167. The Connecticut Hos-
pice has successfully shown that trained volunteers are an integral component of hospice
care and are vitally important in supporting the program, the patients and their families.
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tion, help others in need. By doing so, the hospice volunteer re-
lieves the professional staff and provides support to patients and
their families.
A. TEFRA Requirement
To be Medicare certified, a hospice must document and
maintain a volunteer staff sufficient to provide the equivalent of
at least five percent of the total patient care hours provided by
the entire staff.1"4 The hospice must adequately train the volun-
teers, who may either work in administration or give direct pa-
tient care.1 5 Finally, the hospice must document the cost saving
achieved through the use of the volunteers."
B. Hospital Liability for Volunteers
The integral and unique role that volunteers play in the
hospice organization suggests that consideration should be given
to the tort liability of both the volunteer and the organization.
While there have been no reported cases involving hospice, the
existing potential for tort action requires that providers and vol-
unteers be aware of the legal ramifications of this issue.
1. Basis of Liability
Any consideration of the hospice's liability for negligence of
its volunteers must begin with an examination of the hospital's
responsibility to those whom it serves. The common-law doc-
trine of charitable immunity which prevailed for many years in
American courts has been abolished in almost all jurisdictions.1 17
An important decision abrogating charitable immunity is found
in Georgetown College v. Hughes."8 The Hughes court held that
charitable corporations are responsible for the negligence of
Id. at 172.
114. 42 C.F.R. § 418.70(e) (1986).
115. 42 C.F.R. § 418.70(a)(b) (1986).
116. 42 C.F.R. § 418.70(d) (1986).
117. Comment, Toward a More Realistic and Consistent Use of Respondeat Supe-
rior in the Hospital, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601, 603 (1985).
118. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (involving an action brought by a special nurse
against a charity hospital for injuries resulting when a swinging door was violently
pushed open by a student nurse).
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their servants in suits by "strangers."11 Judge Rutledge's major-
ity opinion stated that "charitable corporations should respond
as others do for the wrongs inflicted by persons who act in their
behalf about their business and within the course of their duties,
actual or apparent."' 120 Subsequent decisions abrogating charita-
ble immunity were controlled by public policy considerations
such as the increased availability of affordable insurance, 2' the
increased solvency of charitable organizations,2 the emphasis
on liability instead of immunity,12 3 and the inconsistency of the
position that a group which purports to act charitably should be
exempt from negligence because of its organizational status. 2 "
The principle of "respondeat superior,"125 or vicarious lia-
bility, has emerged in situations where an employee negligently
injures someone while working for the employer organization.
This doctrine is based on the theory of risk allocation and a pol-
icy determination that employers (and not innocent plaintiffs)
should be responsible for an employee's negligence. 126 In Bing v.
Thunig,27 the court held that respondeat superior applies to sal-
119. Id. at 826 (court defined stranger to include all who "carry on the work of the
institution" as well as "the relative, friend or stranger who visits the sick").
120. Id. at 825.
121. See O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d
835 (1939) (charity hospital was protected by liability insurance, and enforcement of any
judgment recovered would not affect hospital's trust fund or property; paying patient
could enforce liability of hospital for negligence in care and medical treatment).
122. "The hospital of today has grown into an enormous business. They own and
hold large assets, much of it tax free by statute, and employ many persons." See Haynes
v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950). See also
Comment, Patient Recovery-A Poor Prognosis for Hospitals? The Expanding Scope of
Hospital Liability, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 519, 524 (1983).
123. "The law's emphasis generally is on liability, rather than immunity, for wrong-
doing. Charity is generally no defense." Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa
1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950).
124. "It is not too much to expect that those who serve and minister to members of
the public should do so, as do all others, subject to that principle and within the obliga-
tion not to injure through carelessness." See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 10 (1957).
See also Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 645
(1938) (holding that the mere alleged character of the hospital did not excuse it from
liability for negligence as to a paying patient).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979) ("This maxim means that a
master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for
those of his agent.").
126. S. MACKAUF, HOSPITAL LIABILITY 45 (1986).
127. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). In Bing, a patient whose
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aried physicians employed by hospitals. 2 '
Respondeat superior has been applied to situations beyond
the scope of the formal employer/employee relationship. In
Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital,29 the court held that the hospi-
tal was liable for the negligence of an independent contractor
physician in the hospital's emergency room. The court's test for
applying vicarious liability was "one of control in respect to the
manner in which the work is to be done."130
Decisions in cases involving an alleged injury caused by a
volunteer while working for a charitable organization"' have
also relied on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Vicarious lia-
bility is a negligence'32 theory which has been applied, in a
master-servant relationship, to all tortious conduct of the ser-
vant acting within the scope of employment.'33 The hospice's po-
tential liability for the acts of its volunteers can be hypothesized
by reviewing the relationship of the volunteer to the hospice and
the scope of the hospice volunteer's employment.
2. Volunteer's Relationship to the Hospice
In establishing a master-servant relationship, the key ele-
ment is the extent of control 3" the employer exercises over the
back had been treated with an inflammable and potentially dangerous antiseptic, was
severely burned during the course of an operation because of the doctor's alleged negli-
gence in applying an electric cautery to the patient's back. Id.
128. "The test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or profit-making,
as it is for every other employer, was the person who committed the negligent injury-
producing act one of its employees, and if he was, was he acting within the scope of his
employment." Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
129. 52 A.D.2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1976).
130. Id. at 452, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 529 (hospital's control over way doctor managed
emergency made doctor an employee rather than an independent contractor). See Smock
v. Brantley, 76 N.C. App. 73, 331 S.E.2d 714 (1985) (court, relying on fact that hospital
did not supervise or control doctor's activities, held that hospital was not liable for al-
leged negligence of doctors who were assigned to hospital on a rotating basis).
131. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (church held liable for
volunteer's negligence in causing auto accident); Leno v. Y.M.C.A., 17 Cal. App. 3d 651,
95 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1971) (jury question presented regarding Y.M.C.A.'s liability when vol-
unteer's alleged negligence resulted in student drowning).
132. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 499-500 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
133. Id. at 501-02.
134. Id. at 501 (defining servant as person whose physical conduct in the perform-
ance of services is controlled or subject to a right of control).
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employee.13 5 Monetary reimbursement is not necessary to estab-
lish control. 13 Rather, control is defined by the extent to which
the employer may determine the details of the work.137 Indicia
of control over the volunteer are also found in the actions of the
organization after the alleged tort has occured. In Garcia v. Her-
ald Tribune Fresh Air Fund, Inc.,3 ' a child drowned while stay-
ing at the home of a volunteer. After reporting the tragedy, the
volunteer was advised by the organization that it would take
care of all legal matters, that it provided liability insurance cov-
erage to volunteers, and that it would take over control of the
defense of any law suit. The court found these actions to be
more than sufficient evidence in support of a finding of a
master-servant relationship.'
A second element of the master-servant relationship is the
master's consent to receive services and his expectation of a ben-
efit from the service. 40 By the nature of their position in the
organization, hospice volunteers are performing a service which
bestows a benefit on the organization. 141 In Trinity Lutheran
Church Inc. v. Miller,14 2 the organization was found to have re-
ceived a benefit because the volunteer was driving a car for the
church program. Benefits can be substantiated in terms of ser-
135. See generally Comment, Organization's Liability for Torts of Volunteers, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1433 (1985).
136. "One volunteering services without an agreement for or expectation of reward
may be a servant of the one accepting such services." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 225 (1958). See also Baxter v. Morningside, 10 Wash. App. 893, 521 P.2d 946 (1974).
[W]here one volunteers or agrees to assist another, to do something for the other's
benefit, or to submit himself to the control of the other, even without an agree-
ment for or expectation of reward, if the one for whom the service is rendered
consents to its being performed under his direction and control, then the service
may be rendered within the scope of a master-servant relationship.
Id. at 896, 521 P.2d at 948.
137. PROSSER, supra note 132, at 501. See also Baxter, 10 Wash. App. at 898, 521
P.2d at 949. There "was a mutual agreement between [a volunteer and an organization]
controlling the time, destination, purpose and especially the means of [the volunteer's]
undertaking." For a summary of the hospice control over volunteers' work, see supra
note 118.
138. 51 A.D.2d 897, 898, 380 N.Y.S.2d 676, 679 (1976).
139. Id. at 897-98, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
140. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 221 (1958).
141. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
142. 451 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (church found liable when volunteer's car
struck motorcycle).
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vices performed for the organization. Volunteer work in the form
of instruction,14 leadership, ministry, and food service' I
bestows a benefit upon the organization by filling a position in
the organizational work force.
3. Scope of the Hospice Volunteer's Employment
Determining whether a volunteer's negligent conduct is
within the scope of his employment requires an analysis which
examines a number of factors. 4" In general, if the volunteer is
performing an assigned duty, on the organization's time and au-
thorized premises, and with a purpose to serve the organization,
his conduct is considered within the scope of employment. 14 8 In
Scottsdale Jaycees v. Superior Court,49 for example, the court
held that the volunteers traveling to a state board meeting were
not within the scope of the organization's employment because
they were not on the organization's time and authorized prem-
ises.150 On the other hand, evidence that a volunteer divinity
student was performing duties subject to ministerial supervision
and control supported a conclusion that the student was acting
within the scope of his agency while transporting children to a
recreational center.15
Hospice is an organization with a unique philosophical ori-
entation. 6 2 The central concept of hospice is one of caring for
143. Leno v. Y.M.C.A., 17 Cal. App. 3d 651, 95 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1971) (scuba instruc-
tor's negligent supervision led to student drowning).
144. Riker v. Boy Scouts of Am., 8 A.D.2d 565, 183 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1959) (Boy Scouts
held liable for cubmaster's negligence in supervising exhibition).
145. Vind v. Asamblea Apostolica de Ia Feen [sic] Christo Jesus, 148 Cal. App. 2d
597, 307 P.2d 85 (1957) (both church and volunteer minister held liable for minister's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle).
146. Sokolow v. City of Hope, 41 Cal. 2d 668, 262 P.2d 841 (1953) (volunteer injured
while serving food at a town fair).
147. PROSSER, supra note 132, at 502. Relevant considerations include: time, place,
and purpose; routine nature of conduct; and master's expectations. Id.
148. Id.
149. 17 Ariz. App. 571, 499 P.2d 185 (1972).
150. Id. at 575, 499 P.2d at 188-90.
151. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (thirteen-year-old boy was
severely disabled as a result of an automobile accident).
152. A. MuNLEY, supra note 2, at 311. "[B]ecause the philosophy demands extensive
involvement of volunteers, hospice has always had to rely on members of the community
in order to continue .... This immersion into the community projects a message that
hospice is a way of giving care rather than a place for caregiving." Id.
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and assisting a patient at a very critical time in the life of the
patient and his family. Imposing liability on hospice for the torts
of its volunteers could be construed as the antithesis to the es-
sence of hospice as a program of caregivers selflessly sharing
their time and talents with people in need. Nonetheless, the im-
position of liability is a mechanism which encourages organiza-
tions to develop good volunteer management practices as hos-
pice has done with its excellent training program. The well
qualified and trained hospice volunteer is less likely to cause in-
juries. 153 The high degree of control and supervision inherent in
the hospice volunteer program creates a goal oriented working
environment in which the volunteer feels respected.154 In assum-
ing responsibility for the volunteer's actions, hospice effectively
utilizes the volunteer as a trained member of the work force.
C. Protective Measures to Reduce Hospice Liability for a Vol-
unteer's Actions
Certainly the most effective, albeit costly, means of protec-
tion for the hospice is full and complete insurance coverage. In
recognition of its potential liability, the National Hospice Or-
ganization has developed an insurance plan, "Hospice Pak,"
with Frank B. Hall and Company of Massachusetts, Inc., as pro-
gram administrator and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company as program underwriter. 5 The professional liability
portion includes up to one million dollars coverage "for errors,
omissions, mistakes or negligence of employees and volunteers
.. ,,15 Hospice organizations throughout the country are pro-
tected by participating in this plan.157
A dichotomy is created by the fact that exposure to liability
can also be reduced by maximizing the supervision and control
over the volunteer.' While evidence of control increases the po-
tential of liability under respondeat superior, control itself de-
153. Comment, supra note 135, at 1450.
154. Id. at 1451.
155. NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, NHO HosPicE PAK (brochure).
156. Id. at 2.
157. Telephone interview by the author with Thomas L. O'Hara, Jr., Frank B. Hall
& Co. (Mar. 25, 1987).
158. Comment, supra note 135, at 1445 (organization's time in training volunteers
results in higher level of performance and volunteers who are more careful).
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creases the likelihood that the volunteer will perform in a care-
less manner. The pro-active approach of utilizing high standards
in the selection and training of the volunteer is a more positive
and productive means of achieving the same desired result.
Hospice volunteers are an integral part of the organiza-
tion, 159 well prepared,1 0 and highly respected. The twin safe-
guards of insurance coverage and a high degree of control over
the volunteers should minimize the potential for hospice
liability.
IV. Ethical Considerations
A. The Decision to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment
The hospice philosophy is one of providing support for per-
sons in the last phases of an incurable disease. The philosophy is
directed toward maintaining the individual as comfortably as
possible and preparing the patient and his family for the im-
pending death. Since hospice is not a curative treatment of care,
the patient and his family must be prepared to make the deci-
sion to forego life-sustaining treatment.
A patient's right to make decisions about his own body was
firmly established in Schloendorff v. New York Hospital"6 when
Justice Cardozo wrote, "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body." 6 ' The doctrine of informed consent developed as
the legal theory that a person has a right to protect his bodily
integrity."' Kansas Supreme Court Justice Schroeder set the
standard for informed consent when he stated, "Anglo-American
law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self-determination.
It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(E)(i) (1982) (mandating volunteer utilization in provi-
sion of care and services and standards which ensure a continuing level of effort to utilize
volunteers).
160. "Volunteers . . . are carefully trained and screened before their placement in
the most appropriate situation." R. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 25, at 45.
161. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (surgery was performed on a female patient
who had consented only to being examined).
162. Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
163. "The informed consent doctrine is based on principles of individual autonomy,
and specifically on the premise that every person has the right to determine what shall
be done to his own body." PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 190 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of lifesaving surgery, or other medical treat-
ment. ' 1 14 The hospice philosophy incorporates this doctrine of
informed consent when the patient files the election statement
acknowledging that he has been given a "full understanding of
the palliative rather than the curative nature of hospice care. "16 5
The doctrine of informed consent has a constitutional basis
in the right of privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut."'8
In this landmark decision, Justice Douglas' opinion considered
this right to be included within the "penumbra" of the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 167 The Griswold Court found
two Connecticut statutes forbidding anyone to use contracep-
tives and forbidding anyone to aid or counsel another in the use
of contraceptives, to be in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment."'8 In Roe v. Wade,l"9 this constitutional guarantee was
found to protect the freedom of a woman to terminate her preg-
nancy under certain conditions. 17 0 Subsequently, the constitu-
tional right of privacy of the terminally ill patient was addressed
by the seminal decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
In re Quinlan.17 1 The court noted that the right of privacy guar-
anteed under the Constitution is "[p]resumably . . . broad
enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment... in much the same way as it is broad enough to...
164. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) clarified
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) (action by patient against hospital and physician in
charge of its radiology department for injuries sustained as a result of an excessive dose
of radioactive cobalt during radiation therapy).
165. 42 C.F.R. § 418.26 (1986).
166. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
167. Id. at 484. The Griswold court held: "Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy." Id. These guarantees are: first amendment, right of association; third and fourth
amendments, right to privacy and security in one's home; fifth amendment, right to be
free from self-incrimination; ninth amendment, enumerated rights not to disparage other
rights. Id.
168. Id. at 485.
169. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A Texas law making abortion a crime except to save the
mother's life was found to be violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 153.
170. Id. at 154 (subject only to the triggering of state interests in protecting poten-
tial life).
171. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (court authorized
removal of life-sustaining equipment that was maintaining the existence of an irreversi-
bly comatose patient who was not brain dead).
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terminate pregnancy under certain conditions."' 72
A New York court in Eichner v. Dillon173 also concluded
that the right to privacy includes the decision by the incurably
ill to forego medical treatment. 7 The court recognized that a
right to have life-sustaining treatment withheld has also been
premised on a common law right to be free from invasion of
one's own bodily integrity. 71 The Eichner court further noted
that although the common-law and the constitutional theories
have the same result, there is a difference between them; while
common-law rights can be abrogated by statute, constitutional
rights cannot. 17 The court concluded that the rights function
together to give "the incurably ill the right to determine at what
point aggressive therapy should cease.' 77 The hospice patient
who is capable of making a decision about his medical treatment
therefore, has a constitutionally protected right to refuse aggres-
sive therapy and elect hospice care. 17
B. When a Hospice Patient Lacks Decision-Making Capacity
1. The Patient's Interests
The prospective hospice patient who is competent clearly
has a right to refuse aggressive medical treatment. 79 The pa-
tient may, however, be unable to make a decision about his med-
172. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
173. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (Catholic priest petitioned to termi-
nate the respirator assisting an 83-year-old Brother in the same church order).
174. 73 A.D.2d at 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 539. The court stated, "as a matter of consti-
tutional law, a competent adult who is incurably and terminally ill has the right, if he so
chooses, not to resist death and to die with dignity." Id.
175. "Accordingly we conclude that, were Brother Fox competent, he could refuse
medical treatment not only as an exercise of his common-law right to bodily self-deter-
mination, but also pursuant to his constitutional right to privacy." Id. at 461, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 540.
176. Id. at 461-62, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
177. Id. at 462, N.Y.S.2d at 541.
178. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (court permitted removal of an artificial life-sustaining device from a
competent but terminally ill adult). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note
18, at 123; Comment, In re Conroy: A Limited Right to Withhold or Withdraw Artificial
Nourishment, 6 PACE L. REV. 219, 227 (1986) [hereinafter In re Conroy: A Limited
Right].
179. See supra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
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ical treatment. Many factors, such as the debilitating effects of
disease, senility, or trauma, can contribute to the hospice pa-
tient's incapacity. While there is no single definition of incompe-
tency,180 "a person who is unable to understand a situation and
make a choice accordingly" is generally deemed to be incapable
of making a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment.18 1
The right to refuse medical treatment as discussed in this
Comment refers to the patient's right of privacy and choice
which exists even though the incompetent patient is unable to
cognitively exercise that right.1 82 An incompetent's right to re-
fuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do
so.183 As the Quinlan court stated, "[h]er right of privacy . ..
should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. '184
In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,8 a the right of an incompetent to refuse life-prolong-
180. UNIFORM GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 1-201 (West 1983).
A guardian may be appointed by a court to care for an "incapacitated person," defined
as "any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical
illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other
cause (except minority) to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate responsible decisions." Id.
181. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 45. To be capable of making
choices about health care treatment, the individual must have sufficiently stable and
developed personal values and goals, an ability to communicate and understand informa-
tion adequately, and an ability to reason and deliberate sufficiently well about the
choices. See Meisel, The Exception to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Bal-
ance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413,
439-53 (1979). "If the patient 'knows,' 'appreciates,' or 'comprehends' the requisite 'ele-
ments of disclosure,' he is competent." Id. at 446.
182. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (irreversibly comatose 21-year-old wo-
man's right to refuse medical treatment could be exercised on her behalf by her guard-
ian). See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, No. CV-86-0450-PR (Ariz. July 23, 1987) (available
Sept. 8, 1987, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file). The incompetent patient's right to
refuse medical treatment still existed despite her incompetency and her failure to articu-
late her medical treatment desires prior to becoming incompetent. "Because she was in-
capable of exercising that right, however, we must determine who could exercise that
right for her." Id.
183. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 124, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1983) (husband of in-
competent in chronic vegetative state sought and received court permission to discon-
tinue life-sustaining treatment). See Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 464, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
"We further conclude that by standards of logic, morality and medicine the terminally ill
should be treated equally whether competent or incompetent." Id.
184. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
185. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (guardian of a profoundly mentally re-
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/3
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ing treatment was considered. The court recognized a general
right in all persons to refuse medical treatment in appropriate
circumstances. a18 For the incompetent hospice patient with a
prognosis of six months or less of life, the decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment is clearly appropriate when the alternative
is prolonged suffering and loss of autonomy. 1 7 The Saikewicz
decision recognized that because the law tends to treat incompe-
tents the same as competents it may be appropriate in certain
circumstances "for a court to consent to the withholding of
treatment from an incompetent individual." '
2. State's Interest
The individual rights of the incompetent patient to refuse
medical treatment do not stand in unqualified isolation. Rather,
the legitimate state interest in protecting the health and safety
of the people must be balanced against the rights of the individ-
ual. 8 9 The right of a patient to refuse life-sustaining medical
tarded patient in a state home could make the decision to withhold chemotherapy treat-
ment for leukemia).
186. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
187. Id. at 753-54, 370 N.E.2d at 432. The court accepted the factors identified by
the lower court as weighing against administering chemotherapy: the patient's age, the
side effects of treatment, unlikely chances of remission, suffering caused by treatment,
the patient's inability to cooperate with the treatment, and the quality of his life. The
latter was understood by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as "a reference to
the continuing state of pain and disorientation precipitated by the chemotherapy treat-
ment." Id. See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. In speaking of withdrawing
Karen Quinlan's respirator the court stated:
We perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a choice on Karen's
part and a similar choice which, under the evidence in this case, could be made by
a competent patient terminally ill, riddled by cancer and suffering great pain; such
a patient would not be resuscitated or put on a respirator in the example de-
scribed by Dr. Korein, and a fortiori would not be kept against his will on a
respirator.
Id.
188. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
189. Id. at 740-41, 370 N.E.2d at 424-25. The court formulated these countervailing
state interests from a survey of decisions involving the right of an individual to refuse
medical treatment. In particular, the court relied on Application of Pres. and Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
[A] hospital sought [and was granted] permission to perform a blood transfusion
necessary to save the patient's life where the person was unwilling to consent due
to religious beliefs .... The court justified its decision by reasoning that its pur-
pose was to protect three State interests ... viewed as having greater import than
27
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treatment affects the sanctity of life itself and must therefore be
weighed against the state's conflicting interest in preserving
life.190
In the context of medical decisions, the state has a claimed
interest in: 1) the preservation of life, 2) the protection of the
interests of innocent third parties, 3) the prevention of suicide,
and 4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion."' The paramount interest is the preservation of human
life.' 92 There must, however, be a balance struck between the
state interest in prolonging life and the interest of an individual
in rejecting the traumatic cost of that prolongation. s9 When the
cost to the individual is so great in terms of invasion of bodily
integrity and loss of privacy, it has been held to prevail over the
state interest in preserving life. 94
The state interest in protecting innocent third parties is
centered in the theory that minor children must be protected
when a competent adult refuses life-prolonging treatment for
himself. 9 5 A parent who decides to refuse life-sustaining medical
the individual right: (1) the State interest in preventing suicide, (2) a parens pa-
triae interest in protecting ... minor children ... and (3) the protection of [the]
medical profession's desire to act affirmatively to save life without fear of civil
liability.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
190. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (parents seeking to termi-
nate use of their terminally ill child's life support system). "While we agree that the
state has a definite interest in preserving life, we must balance that right against the
rights of an individual." Id. at 370.
191. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
192.
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be
saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State interest where, as
here, the issue is not whether, but when, for how long, and at what cost to the
individual that life may be briefly extended.
Id. at 741-42, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
193. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court weighed the degree of bodily
invasion (respirator, intravenous feeding, catheter) and concluded that Karen's privacy
right outweighed the state interest. "[Tihe State's interest contra weakens and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the progno-
sis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the
State interest." Id.
194. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 427. The court viewed the state
interest in preserving life with "regard to the heavy physical and emotional burdens on
the patient" in prolonging life and found that any person, competent or incompetent,
has a right to be "spared the deleterious consequences of life-prolonging treatment." Id.
195. Id. at 742-43, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (discussing state interest in "protecting third
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/3
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treatment is, in effect, abandoning the minor child whose inter-
ests must be protected. 19 Since a parent's death deprives a child
of vital care and support, the state has a valid interest in sanc-
tioning medical procedures in an effort to preserve the parent's
life.
The third state interest, the prevention of suicide, is based
on the common law concept of suicide as a voluntary act of in-
tentional self-destruction. 19 The decision to refuse life-prolong-
ing treatment, however, is merely an intent to allow the disease
to take its natural course, with the eventual death coming as a
result of the underlying disease. 9 8 Furthermore, in refusing
medical treatment the patient may not have the specific intent
to die but rather a wish to live free of the invasive techniques of
medical intervention. 199
The final state interest is the maintenance of the ethical in-
parties, particularly minor children, from the emotional and financial damage which may
occur as a result of the decision of a competent adult to refuse life-saving or life-prolong-
ing treatment").
196. See, e.g., Application of Pres. & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (mother of a seven-month-old child not permitted
to refuse life-sustaining blood transfusion).
The state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it
should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary abandonments. The patient had
a responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus the people had an
interest in preserving the life of this mother.
Id. at 1008.
197. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 120 (3d ed. 1982).
198. "A death which occurs after the removal of life-sustaining systems is from nat-
ural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the patient." In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743. See also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426
n.11 ("The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if any discussion."
The court noted that a competent's decision to refuse medical treatment is not necessa-
rily considered suicide.). See also Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
The current Penal Law provides for criminal liability solely as to a third party
who aids or promotes the suicide attempt; it does not impose liability against the
individual himself. ... Hence, there seems to be no public policy against permit-
ting a terminally ill patient to choose not to delay the inevitable and imminent
termination of his life - at least insofar as public policy is reflected in the cur-
rent Penal Law.
Id.
199. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980). A competent adult patient in a terminal condition from amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) was being totally sustained by artificial means.
His desire to forego treatment was not classified as suicide because of his basic wish to
live and the fact that he did not self-induce his disease. Id.
29
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tegrity of the medical profession. 00 Since medical ethics do not
require medical intervention in disease at all costs, this interest
is not particularly threatened by permitting competent patients
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.201 In addition, "re-
cent surveys have suggested that a majority of doctors now ap-
prove of passive euthanasia and believe that it is being practiced
by members of the profession."2' 2
The strong and legitimate state interest in preserving life is
usually outweighed by the patient's right of free choice and self-
determination.0 " State intervention may be necessary to protect
the health and welfare of innocent third parties.0 4 The right of
a competent adult, however, to decide on the course of his own
medical treatment has been found to be paramount to the other
three enumerated state interests - preservation of life, preven-
tion of suicide, and maintenance of the integrity of the medical
200. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27. The court considered
this interest as well as the need to allow hospitals the full opportunity to care for people
under their control. In concluding that the right to refuse necessary treatment in appro-
priate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores, the court stated that "it
is not necessary to deny a right of self-determination to a patient in order to recognize
the interests of doctors, hospitals, and medical personnel in attendance on the patient."
Id.
201. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 351-52, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224-25 (1985). A guardian of
an incompetent 84-year-old patient with serious and irreversible physical and mental
impairments and a limited life expectancy was granted permission to have her life-sus-
taining treatment withdrawn. The Conroy court also noted its finding in Quinlan:
"[P]hysicians distinguish between curing the ill and comforting and easing the dying;
they refuse to treat the curable as if they were dying or ought to die, and . . . they have
sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and dying as if they were curable." Id. at 352,
486 A.2d 1225 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47, 350 A*2d at 667).
202. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1225. See also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (consolidation of In re Storar and Eichner
v. Dillon). In reviewing the Eichner case, the dissent stated: "There is reliable informa-
tion that for many years physicians and members of patients' families, often in consulta-
tion with religious counselors, have in actuality been making decisions to withhold or to
withdraw life support procedures from incurably ill patients incapable of making the
critical decision for themselves." Id. at 385, 420 N.E.2d at 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 277
(Jones, J., dissenting).
203. "On balance, the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs any counter-
vailing state interests, and competent persons generally are permitted to refuse medical
treatment, even at the risk of death." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
204. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F.Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Because
the patient had a minor child, a balancing of relevant state interests may have justified
the authorization of a blood transfusion against patient's wishes in order to save his life.
Id.
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profession."0 5
C. Decisionmaking for the Incapacitated Hospice Patient
The federal regulations for a Medicare-certified hospice pro-
gram allow a representative'" of the patient to sign the elective
statement for the patient20 7 The legal authority for this deci-
sionmaking capacity has been developed by the courts in doc-
trines of substitute decisionmaking2 0 Although the courts have
not consistently followed a standard, 0 9 most of the decisions re-
garding surrogate decisionmaking have focused on one of two
standards, the substituted judgment standard 10 and the best in-
terest standard.2 1
205. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1226.
206. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (1986) ("defining representative as a person who is, because
of the individual's mental or physical incapacity, authorized in accordance with State law
to execute or revoke an election for hospice care or terminate medical care on behalf of
the terminally ill individual").
207. 42 C.F.R. § 418.26 (1986) (requiring election statement to include the "individ-
ual's or representative's acknowledgement that he or she has been given a full under-
standing of the palliative rather than curative nature of hospice care, as it relates to the
individual's terminal illness").
208. See generally In re Conroy: A Limited Right, supra note 178, at 229-34.
209. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
The court declined to apply the substituted judgment standard where the profoundly
retarded, terminally ill patient had never been competent at any time during his life. In
refusing to grant the patient's mother the right to decide whether the patient would
want life-prolonging treatment ceased, the court reasoned that it is "unrealistic to at-
tempt to determine" how a person who was never competent to make a decision would
choose were he competent. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
210. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (kidney removed from
incompetent to save the life of his normal brother). "The right to act for the incompe-
tent in all cases has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted
judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters
touching on the well-being of the ward." Id. at 148.
211. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 135. The best interests stan-
dard rests solely on protection of the patient's welfare. Factors to be taken into account
include the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning, and the
quality, as well as the extent, of the life sustained. For a relevant discussion of standards
in substitute decision-making, see Comment, In re Conroy, A Limited Right, supra note
178, at 228-41.
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1. The Quinlan Approach
The substituted judgment standard, adopted by the court in
Quinlan,1 2 allowed an incompetent patient's father to give his
best judgment as to whether his daughter would have exercised
her right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment if she were
able.21 s By expressing his daughter's intent, Karen Quinlan's fa-
ther was able to exercise her right of privacy and right to pre-
serve her bodily integrity. ' 4
2. The Saikewicz Approach
The court in Saikewicz acknowledged the benefit of the
substituted judgment standard in that the standard respects the
integrity and autonomy of the individual.216 In this case, how-
ever, the incompetent patient was a profoundly retarded man
who was never able to express his intent as to the medical treat-
ment.216 In formulating its version of the substituted judgment
doctrine, the court looked to the history of the doctrine,217 and
stated that the court must ask the decisionmaker to step into
the incompetent's shoes, to include the factor of his permanent
incompetency, and then to choose as if he were competent.2 ' "
3. The Conroy Approach
In an important New Jersey Supreme Court decision, In re
Conroy,s1 9 the rights of an elderly, incompetent woman to refuse
life-sustaining treatment were at issue. The subjective standard
of substituted judgment as formulated by the Conroy court is
dependent on a clear expression by the patient that she would
212. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
213. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
214. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. A decision to refuse medical treatment is a valua-
ble incident of the patient's right to privacy. The family's best judgment prevents the
destruction of this right. Id.
215. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
216. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
217. "The English Court accomplished this purpose by substituting itself as nearly
as possible for the incompetent, and acting on the same motives and considerations as
would have moved him." Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
218. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
219. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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have refused the treatment under the circumstances involved.220
The Conroy court enumerated several items which might indi-
cate a patient's intent to refuse treatment, including: a "living
will";22 ' an oral directive to a family member, friend, or health
care provider;2 2 durable power of attorney; 223 the patient's ar-
ticulated reaction to medical treatment administered to
others;22 a person's religious beliefs;225 and the patient's consis-
tent pattern of conduct as to prior decisions about his own med-
ical care. 2 6 If however, it is impossible to ascertain the incompe-
tent's wishes, the courts have looked to a best interest
standard.227
On the theory that an incompetent is a ward of the state,
the state's parens patriae22 s power supports the authority of its
courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that
serve the incompetent's best interest. The court in In re Conroy
formulated two best interest tests, a limited objective and a pure
220. "The standard we are enunciating is a subjective one, consistent with the no-
tion that the right that we are seeking to effectuate is a very personal right to control
one's own life." Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (court applied the substituted judgment doctrine
in finding a living will persuasive evidence of incompetent patient's intention).
221. D. MEYER, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 502-03 n.78
(1981). A living will is a written document which advises the physician of the patient's
wishes for terminal care. Id.
222. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 136-37. An oral directive is an
instruction given verbally which specifies the type of care a person wants or does not
want to receive. Id.
223. Id. at 137. A durable power of attorney provides legal authority for an advance
directive regarding the type of health care a person wants in the event that he is unable
to make decisions for himself. Id.
224. See Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 439-40, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 526. During a discussion
about the Quinlan case, the patient stated that he "would not want any of this ex-
traordinary business . . . to be done for him." Id.
225. A. MEYER, supra note 221, at 588. All religions except Orthodox Judaism "ac-
cept that the withdrawal of extraordinary medical care in cases where death is clinically
certain and treatment will only prolong the process of dying is morally proper and does
not constitute euthanasia." Id.
226. See In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1982). The
completely expressed and repeated views against continued life-sustaining dialysis treat-
ment were honored despite the onset of incompetence due to disease induced coma. Id.
227. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-62, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985).
228. "[L]iterally 'parent of the country', [parens patriae] refers traditionally to
[the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
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objective test.22 Under the limited objective test, treatment may
be withheld or withdrawn "when there is some trustworthy evi-
dence that the patient would have refused the treatment. '230
The test also requires that it must be clear to the decisionmaker
that the pain and suffering of the treatment outweigh the bene-
fits of continued life.23' This test can be applied in the absence
of the clear and concrete evidence of intent necessary to satisfy
the substituted judgment test.
In the absence of any evidence of the patient's wishes, treat-
ment may still be withheld or withdrawn under a pure objective
test.232 This higher standard adds the requirement that the "re-
curring, unavoidable, and severe pain of the patient's life with
the treatment" renders that life-sustaining treatment inhu-
mane.233 The court refused to "authorize decision-making based
on assessments of the personal worth or social utility of an-
other's life, or the value of the life to others. '23 4
4. The Colyer Approach
In In re Colyer,235 an action to disconnect life support sys-
tems, there was "no evidence that Bertha Colyer explicitly ex-
pressed her desire to refuse life sustaining treatment. 2 3 Yet,
evidence that the patient was an independent woman who dis-
liked going to doctors, allowed the court to find that her guard-
ian "was exercising his best judgment as to Bertha's personal
choice when he requested the removal of the life support
system. 237
The family and the physicians of the hospice patient can
229. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. See also Comment, In re Con-
roy, A Limited Right, supra note 178, at 250-51.
230. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33 (court holding that it was inappropriate to allow
a surrogate to determine on the basis of the incompetent's value to society that his life
was not worth living).
235. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
236. Id. at 132, 660 P.2d at 748.
237. Id. Evidence that she would have requested withdrawal of treatment as well as
absence of any evidence of bad motives convinced the court that Bertha Colyer's hus-
band was acting in her best interest. Id.
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utilize these judicial guidelines2 38 in making a determination of
whether to elect the hospice treatment of care and forego life-
sustaining treatment. If an incompetent has previously ex-
pressed his wishes, the representative's role is clearly to abide by
those wishes. In the absence of such a directive, however, the
representative must balance the burden of pain against the ben-
efit of withholding aggressive treatment and choose a course that
will promote the patient's well-being.
D. Choosing the Decisionmaker
Designating the appropriate surrogate for the incompetent
patient is a matter of making a careful evaluation of the person
who can best represent the patient's interest. For hospice care,
the respresentative is usually a family member who must make
the decision to provide the physical and emotional support of
the palliative program.239 The President's Commission believes
that a family member is best designated as surrogate.240 The
family is generally most concerned with what is best for the pa-
tient and most knowledgeable about the patient's goals and val-
ues.2 41 Case law supports the concept that the family, physician,
and patient are best qualified to make the decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment. 42
The closeness of the family relationship has been empha-
sized in court decisions with a sensitivity to the family's natural
role as surrogate. The Quinlan court spoke of the "character and
general suitability" of Karen's father and "the high degree of
familial love. 24 3 The Eichner court emphasized the length of
the relationship and considered a member of the patient's reli-
238. See supra text accompanying notes 178, 209-237.
239. R. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 25, at 4.
240. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 126-30.
241. Id. at 128.
242. See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (parents of terminally ill
infant); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)
(wife); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (father); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (husband); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980)
(wife and son).
243. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 29-30, 53, 355 A.2d at 657, 660. The Quinlan court
imposed an additional requirement of approval by a hospital ethics committee. 70 N.J. at
54, 355 A.2d at 671.
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gious community to be a member of the patient's family.244
Although courts acknowledge the important role of the fam-
ily, there have been cases requiring judicial intervention in
choosing a surrogate. 46 The close family member is the most ap-
propriate representative for the hospice patient.246 Care must be
taken, however, to be certain that the representative is not moti-
vated by conflicting interests.247 A son, daughter, or spouse may
wish to hasten death and be relieved of the financial and emo-
tional burden of care. Conversely, these same family members
may unduly prolong the suffering of the terminally ill patient in
a selfish effort to extend the patient's life. Finally, the physi-
cian's role in hospice is critical to provide the necessary balance
of medical values to the family's emotional concern for the
patient.4 8
244. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 473, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 548 ("Such an individual who has
known and loved the patient personally, presumably for years, can best determine what
that patient would have wanted under the circumstances."). The court concluded, how-
ever, that there was also a need for a final decision by the judiciary. Id. at 550, 355
A.D.2d at 477, modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 276. The Court of Appeals held that the family may apply for a judicial
ruling but that it is not mandatory. Id.
245. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. Resolution of the question
of whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from an incompe-
tent person is the sole responsibility of the judiciary. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (no family to represent interests of patient who had always been
incompetent).
246. Greer & Mor, How Medicare is Altering the Hospice Movement, HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT (Oct. 1985). In the home health hospice and the independent hospice,
during the last weeks of the patient's life, the families provide an average of sixteen
hours per day of direct patient care. Id.
247.
There is no guarantee that a family member or friend will have only the patient's
interest at heart .... [An heir . . . [may be] motivated more by self-interest ...
[or] [a]t the other extreme, a family member.., motivated more by guilt than...
concern for the patient, might consent to treatment which the patient himself
would have refused.
Meisel, The Exceptions to the Informed Consent Doctrine, Striking a Balance Between
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 479-80 (1979).
248. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984). A close family member may exercise the patient's right, but certification is re-
quired from the primary treating physician and from two other physicians. Id.
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V. The Patient's Right to Make an Informed Choice
The basic rights of the terminally ill patient must be pre-
served by giving him the necessary information to make an in-
formed therapeutic decision." ' The fact that the patient is fac-
ing death heightens the need for full disclosure.25 ° Under the
doctrine of informed consent, the physician has a duty both to
disclose risks and to obtain consent.2 5 In order to make a deci-
sion that respects the patient's right to self-determination, the
prospective hospice patient needs information in three areas.
The first area is the patient's basic need to be told that his ill-
ness is terminal.2 52 Secondly, the patient must be informed as to
the meaning of hospice care and the ramifications of a palliative
treatment.253 Finally, the patient has a right to be informed
about the traditional treatment that would be available to
him.
254
A. The Patient's Right to Know About His Terminal Illness
The patient's terminal illness is a material fact about his
body. The court in Gates v. Jensen255 determined that the phy-
sician's knowledge of a glaucoma condition in the patient's body
249. Comment, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1658 (1974).
The terminal patient has a right to self-determination through informational consent.
"[D]ignity of the patient, informed consent, and the opportunity to arrange one's affairs
dictate that the patient should be told of his condition." Id. at 1658.
250. LeBlang & King, Tort Liability for Nondisclosure: The Physician's Legal Obli-
gation to Disclose Patient Illness and Injury, 89 DICK. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1984). Full dis-
closure of a fatal illness such as cancer is required in order that the individual be able to
make final life and death decisions. Id. at 18-23.
251. "The 'information' element of informed consent concerns the scope of the phy-
sician's duty to disclose collateral risks." Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 630 (1970).
252. Kuzma, Hospice, the Legal Ramifications of a Place to Die, 56 IND. L.J. 680
(1980-1981). The reasoning that informed consent is based on the premise of self-deter-
mination applies to terminally ill as well as curable patients. Id.
253. The physician has a duty to disclose a material risk. "A risk is thus material
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the pa-
tient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk ... in deciding whether
or not to undergo the proposed therapy." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 251, at 640.
254. Tietz, Informed Consent In the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case,
61 WASH. L. REV. 367, 372 (1986) (to assist patient in making informed choice, physician
must disclose all treatment alternatives and risks associated with them).
255. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
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created a duty to inform the patient.2 5  The patient was de-
prived of her right to choose whether or not to treat for
glaucoma because the physician failed to inform her of the test
results.257
The Supreme Court of California required disclosure to as-
sist the patient's informed choice in Truman v. Thomas.258 The
court relied on its previous holding in Cobbs v. Grant259 that ef-
fective consent must be informed consent.2 0 The Truman court
found that the doctor breached his duty to the patient by failing
to inform her of the risks inherent in allowing cervical cancer to
develop undetected by a pap smear.26 ' The court noted that "the
duty to disclose was imposed in Cobbs so that the patients might
meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions about their
own bodies."2 62 The terminally ill patient must also make
choices regarding options for treatment - aggressive interven-
tion or palliative care.2 63 Even though death is inevitable, the
256. Id. at 251, 595 P.2d at 923.
The existence of an abnormal condition in one's body, the presence of a high risk
of disease, and the existence of alternative diagnostic procedures to conclusively
determine the presence or absence of that disease are all facts which a patient
must know in order to make an informed decision on the course which future
medical care will take.
Id.
257. Id.
258. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980), rev'g 93 Cal. App. 3d
304, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979) (wrongful death action in doctor's alleged negligent failure
to inform patient of the risks of refusing a pap smear test which would have disclosed
the presence of cervical cancer, the cause of plaintiff's death).
259. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (medical malpractice action
against physician for failure to inform patient of risks inherent in surgery for duodenal
ulcer).
260.
[T]he patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent.
... Therefore, we hold, as an integral part of physician's overall obligation to the
patient there is a duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with re-
spect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially involved
in each.
Id. at 242-43, 502 P.2d at 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
261. Truman, 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (patient's
refusal to undergo risk-free test does not lessen doctor's duty to disclose material risks
attendant to failure to proceed with the test).
262. Id. at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (court holding that physician
was obligated to provide patient with all information material to her decision).
263. LeBlang & King, supra note 250, at 5-6 (physician's duty to disclose illness has
been expanded in recent years reflecting an emphasis on personal right).
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patient has an inherent right to know the nature of his illness
and to choose the course of treatment.2 64
The doctrine of informed consent has two elements: duty to
disclose and breach of that duty.26 5 Failure to disclose all the
options available to a terminally ill patient is a breach of the
physician's duty. 66 Proving negligence under the standard defi-
nition of harm267 may, however, be difficult when the protected
interest is choice, not physical well-being.2 68
B. Patient's Right to Know the Meaning of Palliative Treat-
ment
The hospice regulations mandate that an informed consent
must be obtained from the patient or the patient's representa-
tive.26 9 Under the analysis of informed consent,270 the physician
has an affirmative duty to obtain consent and to make disclo-
sures. The unique nature of the hospice program of palliative
care27 1 must be carefully explained to the patient to ensure that
264. Truman, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (patient's right to
know of risk in foregoing a diagnostic test). See also Gates, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d
919 (patient's right to know about presence of disease).
265. Tietz, supra note 254, at 372 (patient must prove that failure to inform was
proximate cause of injuries).
266. *Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest,
95 YALE L.J. 219 at 252 (1985-1986). See also id. 250-53.
267. PROSSER, supra note 132, at 165 (elements of a cause of action in negligence
include actual damage or harm and proof of damage).
268. "[Tjhe patient with a desire to go home or to a hospice to die, who is instead
maintained alive by hospital machinery, might have difficulty establishing 'injury' under
definitions of an interest in physical well-being rather than choice." Shultz, supra note
266, at 252.
269.
A hospice must demonstrate respect for an individual's rights by ensuring that an
informed consent form that specifies the type of care and services that may be
provided as hospice care during the course of the illness has been obtained for
every individual, either from the individual or the representative.
42 C.F.R. § 418.62 (1983).
270. "The patient must be informed about the treatment before his consent is valid;
he must be informed of the nature and purpose of the proposed procedure, the likelihood
of success, the hazards of the procedure, and any alternative forms of treatment." Mei-
sel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 420 (1979).
271.
Because they recognize that their orientation differs from the norm in health care
today, most hospices discuss their philosophy and approach with potential pa-
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the consent obtained is an informed consent.272
The court in Sard v. Hardy27 determined that the scope of
a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alternatives
should be governed by the amount of information the patient
needs to make an informed decision. 27 The physician has a duty
to communicate the risks and alternatives to the patient, so as
to give that patient the right to weigh the alternatives against
his expectations. The hospice patient also has a need for in-
formation. Although the palliative program may not involve
risks, the patient cannot make an informed choice without fac-
tual knowledge.
Controlling and alleviating pain is a major focus of the hos-
pice program. 27' The hospice approach is to consider all the
sources of pain, whether they be psychological, spiritual, social,
or physical.277 "Anticipation of extended episodes of pain leads
to anxiety, depression, and insomnia for the terminal patient,
and these in turn aggravate the physical component of the
pain.''27 The hospice approach is to break this cycle by treating
tients and their families in order to enhance patient self-determination.... None-
theless, some patients do not realize that hospice admission amounts to a decision
to forego . . . resuscitation, continuous cardiovascular monitoring or
chemotherapy.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 113-14.
272. Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 251, at 637. "Since the patient's interest in
making an informed decision is paramount, the first principle is that all material risks
should be disclosed to him." Id.
273. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977) (action against physician on theory that he
negligently performed a tubal ligation on plaintiff and failed to inform her that the pro-
cedure was not absolute).
274. Id. at 442, 379 A.2d at 1021 (court stated that appropriate test of physician's
duty to disclose should focus "on what data the patient requires to make an intelligent
decision").
275. Id. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1021-22. The court noted that the general standard
protects the patient from "a possible general conspiracy of silence, whenever it may exist
among physicians." Id.
276. "One of the greatest contributions of the first modern hospice, St. Christo-
pher's in England, has been its focus on pain and symptom control." A. MUNLEY, supra
note 2, at 20.
277. R. BUCKINGHAM, supra note 25, at 24 (emphasis on the work of multidiscipli-
nary team in meeting all patient needs). See also id. at 21 (use of diversionary activities
such as occupational and physical therapy).
278. Id. at 20 (discussing the multidimensional task of relieving the terminal pa-
tient's discomfort).
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all its components." 9 The facts of this primary method of treat-
ment should be communicated to the patient to enable him to
understand and analyze his options.
Physical pain is treated with narcotics: codeine for moderate
pain and morphine for severe pain.280 Patients in the terminal
stages of cancer sometimes experience intense pain that can only
be relieved by administering such large doses of morphine that
the patient suffers from respiratory depression.281 There have
been no cases of liability attaching to the physician in this situa-
tion.2"" Nonetheless, the doctor must obtain the consent of the
patient or the representative before administering morphine.283
The innovative nature of hospice may present an even
stronger need to familiarize the patient with the components of
hospice care. The common expectation is for treatment under
the traditional model of aggressive medical intervention. Pa-
tients must, therefore, be informed of the nature of the hospice
treatment of care, of symptom control, and of the expected man-
ifestations of their illnesses.2 84
C. Patient's Right to Seek Traditional Treatment
The informational needs of a patient suffering from an in-
curable disease also include the right to know all of the options
for treatment that are available to him.2 s8 The patient needs to
279. Id. at 20-21 (ascertaining patient needs, educating the patient and family in
nursing care, mitigating symptoms of malignant disease).
280. M. HAMILTON & H. REID, supra note 113, at 80, 84. See generally PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 277-97 (discussing symptom control for the termi-
nally ill).
281. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 77 n.100. See also id. at 295
("[S]evere dyspnea.... can again be treated with morphine. Although this approach is
far from perfect, it does allow the physician to improve upon what is otherwise a singu-
larly terrifying and agonizing final few hours.").
282. "[A]lthough medication is commonly used to relieve the suffering of dying pa-
tients (even when it causes or risks causing death), physicians are not held to have vio-
lated the law." Id. at 78.
283. Id. at 80. In using morphine or other pain related medicine that can lead to
death, the physician must have the consent of the patient or surrogate. Id.
284. "[Hlospices risk pressuring patients to accept death too readily and to forego
potentially life-sustaining therapies too quickly." Id. at 115.
285. Comment, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1658.
The terminal patient has a right to self-determination through informational consent.
"[D]ignity of the patient, informed consent and the opportunity to arrange one's affairs
dictate that the patient should be told of his condition." Id. See also D. HUMPHREY & A.
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know the likelihood of remission of the disease and the stages of
degeneration that the disease will take.2 86 The patient must be
aware that it is sometimes difficult to prognisticate a life expec-
tancy and that aggressive treatment may be appropriate if the
patient lives longer than predicted.2 87 Recognizing these infor-
mational needs, a court, in the landmark decision of Canterbury
v. Spence,288 held that the physician has a duty to warn of in-
herent dangers in the proposed treatment and to impart infor-
mation. 89 In this way, the autonomy of the terminally ill patient
can be carefully guarded and his right of self-determination can
be ensured.290
VI. Conclusion
In less than twenty years, hospice has grown from a grass-
roots movement supported by a few dedicated visionaries to a
federally subsidized program under the nation's health care sys-
tem. An innovative approach to the care of the terminally ill, the
hospice development significantly impacts the entire health care
system.
Congressional support of hospice has been expressed by in-
cluding hospice under TEFRA, 91 the Medicare benefit program.
As the public responds in increased numbers of Medicare-certi-
fied hospice programs, Congress must make a careful assessment
WICKETT, RIGHT TO DIE, 184 (1986) (oncologists would prefer patients to seek anti-cancer
therapy before care based on symptom control).
286. Comment, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 381 ("A candid exchange of infor-
mation about alternative means of dying, particularly between a doctor and the terminal
patient, will ensure that the patient's decision is fully informed as well as voluntary.").
287. "Over the past 40 years I have seen the treatment of many disseminated can-
cers improve to the point at which palliative therapy has evolved into curative ther-
apy. . . .To avoid patient abuse and premature demise I would suggest a 'second opin-
ion' for all patients being considered for hospice terminal care." N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,
1985, at A26, col. 1 (letter to the editor of The New York Times from Dr. Ezra M. Green-
span, medical director of the Chemotherapy Foundation.
288. 464 F.2d 772 (1972). The appellant sought damages for personal injuries alleg-
edly sustained as a result of an operation negligently performed by the physician. Id.
289. "We now find, as part of the physician's overall obligation to the patient, a
similar duty of reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and
the dangers inherently and potentially involved." Id. at 782.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 161-78.
291. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-1 to 1395h, 1395x to 1395z, 1395aa to 1395cc (1982).
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to ascertain if the intended benefits, better and more cost effec-
tive care for the terminally ill, are being realized.
State legislatures have also responded to hospice by enact-
ing licensure laws to provide further protection for the con-
sumer. All states without licensing statutes for hospice should
consider enacting such legislation to assure a high standard of
hospice care and to extend the benefit of hospice to all its
citizens.29
The philosophy of hospice raises an issue of patient's rights
which has legal significance for all concerned in the delivery of
hospice care - provider and consumer alike. Hospice sustains
the patient's right to choose to end his life naturally without ag-
gressive medical intervention. The element of choice must al-
ways be paramount.
As an accepted and supported program of health care, hos-
pice is entering the second phase of its growth. In the next dec-
ade, the hospice program will face the challenges of greater par-
ticipation which will create increased demands on the hospice
principles in the delivery of quality care. One significant chal-
lenge is meeting the needs of AIDS victims, many of whom do
not have primary caregivers, a requisite of the home health
model of care.29  Further legislative action may be needed to
provide access to the benefits of hospice care to a greater portion
of the population. In this legislative process, however, hospice
must be vigilant to preserve its unique focus on the patient and
his family.
Audrey Sander Hagerman
292. Hospice Licensure and Reguldtions: Issues and Guidelines (Jan. 1986). The
National Hospice Organization outlines five primary reasons for licensing hospices: "pro-
tection of terminally ill patients and their families," "protection of the public," "provi-
sion of a sound legal basis for practice as part of the health system," "establishment of a
mechanism to ensure reimbursement from third party payers," and "protection of the
'hospice' name." Id.
293. Telephone interview by the author with Ira Bates, National Hospice Organiza-
tion (Mar. 23, 1987).
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